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We analyze the impact of product market competition on unemployment and wages, and how 
this depends on labour market institutions. We use differential changes in regulations across 
OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s to identify the effects of competition. We find that 
increased product market competition reduces unemployment, and that it does so more in 
countries with labour market institutions that increase worker bargaining power. The theoretical 
intuition is that both firms with market power and unions with bargaining power are constrained 
in their behaviour by the elasticity of demand in the product market. We also find that the effect 
of increased competition on real wages is beneficial to workers, but less so when they have high 
bargaining power. Intuitively, real wages increase through a drop in the general price level, but 
workers with bargaining power lose out somewhat from a reduction in the rents that they had 
previously captured.  
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Executive Summary 
High rates of unemployment remain a key policy concern across many European countries. 
There is a large literature investigating the role of unions, taxes, and other labour market 
institutions in explaining variation in unemployment rates across countries. In a recent 
contribution to this literature, Nickell et al (2005) find that changes in these factors can explain 
about 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the 1960s to the first half of the 1990s. 
However, it seems likely that changes in labour market institutions alone cannot explain the wide 
divergences in unemployment experiences across countries. For example, Blanchard (2005) 
argues that a complex interaction between institutions and other shocks provides an important 
part of the explanation. 
In particular, conditions in the product market are also likely to play an important role. Theory 
suggests that product market competition is a key determinant of employment – in imperfectly 
competitive markets firms restrict output and thus employment. More intense competition pulls 
prices closer to marginal cost, increasing output demanded by consumers and, therefore, labour 
demanded by producers. A number of recent theoretical papers have emphasized the role of 
product market competition, as well as potentially important interactions between competition 
and labour market institutions. A recognition of the role of competition also lies behind many of 
the current attempts to reform product markets in Europe, including those laid out in the Lisbon 
Agenda and the Services Directive. 
In this paper we investigate the impact of increased product market competition on employment 
and wages using data across OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s. Our contribution to the 
literature is twofold. First, we use time-varying policy reforms to provide exogenous variation in 
product market conditions, enabling us to provide stronger evidence that competition increases 
employment and real wages than exists so far. We show that these effects have been 
quantitatively important in explaining movements in unemployment and wages in OECD 
countries over the past twenty years.  
Secondly, we provide evidence that the size of these effects varies with labour market 
institutions. Theory suggests that the positive impact of competition on employment is greater 
where workers’ bargaining power is high. The reason for this is that unions who care about 
employment as well as wages are constrained by the level of competition in the product market.     3
Therefore an increase in competition in an economy with both monopolistic firms and unions 
will lead to greater reductions in prices and greater increases in output than in an economy 
without unions. In contrast, under some conditions the positive impact of competition on real 
wages may be smaller when workers have more bargaining power, since the negative impact of 
competition on the general price level may be partially offset by a reduction in the level of rents 
captured by workers.  
We use the substantial market liberalisations that have occurred across countries over the past 
two decades to provide exogenous variation in competitive conditions. These include reforms 
that reduce barriers to entry, tariff rates and regulatory barriers to trade, remove price controls 
and reduce public involvement in production. We find strong evidence that reforms such as these 
decrease the average level of profits in the economy, which in turn increases employment and 
real wages. The positive effect on employment is found to be greater, and the positive effect on 
real wages lower, in economies with greater worker bargaining power (those with higher 
collective bargaining coverage and/or higher union membership). To capture cross-country 
variation in bargaining power we use initial values of bargaining coverage and unionisation in 
order to mitigate possible endogeneity problems.  
In the literature there is strong empirical evidence that labour market institutions matter in 
determining labour market outcomes, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that product 
market regulations are also important, but there is little empirical evidence to support this. In 
addition, some theory suggests that the impact of product market competition on labour market 
outcomes varies with labour market institutions. There is, however, even less empirical evidence 
to support this latter prediction. 
Our results have interesting implications for policy. First, widespread product market reforms 
will benefit workers and the economy as a whole through increased employment and higher real 
wages. Second, the presence of strong unions is not a reason to shy away from product market 
reform – if anything there is more incentive to reform as the employment benefits may be larger. 
However, it is also under these circumstances that reform may be most resisted as existing 
workers have less to gain.     4
1  Introduction 
High rates of unemployment remain a key policy concern across many European countries. 
Following the OECD Jobs Study (1994) a large literature has investigated the role of unions, 
taxes, and other labour market institutions in explaining variation in unemployment rates across 
countries.
1 In a recent contribution to this literature, Nickell et al (2005) find that changes in 
these factors can explain about 55% of the rise in European unemployment from the 1960s to the 
first half of the 1990s. However, it seems likely that changes in labour market institutions alone 
cannot explain the wide divergences in unemployment experiences across countries. For 
example, Blanchard (2005) argues that a complex interaction between institutions and other 
shocks provides an important part of the explanation. 
In particular, conditions in the product market are also likely to play an important role. Theory 
suggests that product market competition is a key determinant of employment – in imperfectly 
competitive markets firms restrict output and thus employment. More intense competition pulls 
prices closer to marginal cost, increasing output demanded by consumers and, therefore, labour 
demanded by producers. A number of recent theoretical papers have emphasized the role of 
product market competition, as well as potentially important interactions between competition 
and labour market institutions.
2 A recognition of the role of competition also lies behind many of 
the current attempts to reform product markets in Europe, including those laid out in the Lisbon 
Agenda and the Services Directive. 
In this paper we investigate the impact of increased product market competition on employment 
and wages using data across OECD countries over the 1980s and 1990s. Our contribution to the 
literature is twofold. First, we use time-varying policy reforms to provide exogenous variation in 
product market conditions, enabling us to provide stronger evidence that competition increases 
employment and real wages than exists so far. We show that these effects have been 
quantitatively important in explaining movements in unemployment and wages in OECD 
countries over the past twenty years.  
                                                 
1 See, amongst others, Elmeskov, Martin and Scarpetta (1998), Nickell and Layard (1999), Blanchard and Wolfers 
(2000), Belot and van Ours (2001). 
2 See for example Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), Spector (2004) and Ebell and Haefke (2004).     5
Secondly, we provide evidence that the size of these effects varies with labour market 
institutions. Theory suggests that the positive impact of competition on employment is greater 
where workers’ bargaining power is high. The reason for this is that unions who care about 
employment as well as wages are constrained by the level of competition in the product market. 
Therefore an increase in competition in an economy with both monopolistic firms and unions 
will lead to greater reductions in prices and greater increases in output than in an economy 
without unions. In contrast, under some conditions the positive impact of competition on real 
wages may be smaller when workers have more bargaining power, since the negative impact of 
competition on the general price level may be partially offset by a reduction in the level of rents 
captured by workers.  
We use the substantial market liberalisations that have occurred across countries over the past 
two decades to provide exogenous variation in competitive conditions. These include reforms 
that reduce barriers to entry, tariff rates and regulatory barriers to trade, remove price controls 
and reduce public involvement in production. We find strong evidence that reforms such as these 
decrease the average level of profits in the economy, which in turn increases employment and 
real wages. The positive effect on employment is found to be greater, and the positive effect on 
real wages lower, in economies with greater worker bargaining power (those with higher 
collective bargaining coverage and/or higher union membership). To capture cross-country 
variation in bargaining power we use initial values of bargaining coverage and unionisation in 
order to mitigate possible endogeneity problems.  
Our work is related to three key literatures. First, as discussed above, there is a substantial 
empirical literature investigating the labour market determinants of unemployment. In general 
this work finds that labour market institutions, taxes and benefits have important effects on the 
level of employment, although the nature and size of the effects varies somewhat across studies.   
Secondly, there is a body of theoretical work on the impact of product market regulations on 
employment and wages. Static equilibrium models of monopolistic competition in the goods 
market and bargaining over employment and wages in the labour market suggest that increasing     6
product market competition increases employment and real wages.
3 Dynamic models of firms’ 
labour demand in the presence of wage bargaining confirm these results.
4 These models also 
suggest that the employment increase is greater when workers bargain collectively, even when 
the workers’ choice of bargaining regime is endogenised as in Ebell and Haefke (2004).  
Thirdly, there is a recent and smaller empirical literature on the impact of product market 
regulations on employment and wages. At the micro level, Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) look at 
the impact of entry restrictions introduced in the French retail industry to protect small 
businesses from large suppliers. They find that such restrictions reduced employment but did not 
have a significant effect on wages, possibly because most employees in this sector are paid the 
minimum wage. Kugler and Pica (2003) use micro data from Italy and find that strict product 
market regulations reduce the effects of labour market reforms on employment. Andersen, 
Haldrup and Sorensen (2000) find evidence that increased trade in the EU, possibly due to 
increased liberalisation through schemes such as the Single Market Programme, lead to increased 
wage convergence and an increase in cross border wage dependency. Pissarides (2001) finds a 
negative correlation between a measure of business start-up costs and employment rates across a 
sample of OECD countries.  
Most similar to this paper, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) estimate the impact of product market 
reforms on employment rates across OECD countries, as well as a range of potential interactions 
between product market reforms and labour market institutions. Consistent with the discussion 
above, they find that restrictive product market regulations have reduced employment rates in 
some OECD countries, particularly those where labour market institutions provide strong 
bargaining power to insiders. Our approach differs from Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2005) in a 
number of important ways. First, we use indicators of product market reforms that affect both 
traded and non-traded sectors of the economy, rather than a selection of seven regulated 
‘network’ industries as in their case. Regulation in the industries they consider has very different 
characteristics to the barriers to entry and competition in the rest of the economy, and trends in 
                                                 
3 Nickell (1999) discusses some of the main intuitions. The basic framework of several recent papers draws on 
elements of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) is a model 
without capital. Spector (2004) introduces capital and finds the same result for employment, but finds that real 
wages may actually decrease following an increase in competition. 
4 Ebell and Haefke (2004), Commendatore and Kubin (2005).     7
these industries are unlikely to be representative of overall trends in product market regulation. 
Secondly, we allow the impact of product market reforms to vary across different types of 
reform, rather than imposing strong a priori restrictions by calculating a single index of 
regulation.
5 Thirdly we investigate the parallel predictions of theory for real wages as well as 
employment. And finally, drawing on the underlying theoretical motivation, we explicitly model 
the impact of product market reforms on competition, as proxied by the average level of profits 
in the economy. Without this step the channel for the impact of product market regulations on 
employment and wages is not clear. 
In summary, there is strong empirical evidence that labour market institutions matter in 
determining labour market outcomes, there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that product 
market regulations are also important, but there is little empirical evidence to support this. In 
addition, some theory suggests that the impact of product market competition on labour market 
outcomes varies with labour market institutions. There is, however, even less empirical evidence 
to support this latter prediction. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out a theoretical framework. In section 3 
we explain our empirical methodology and discuss the data. Section 4 presents the results, and a 
final section  concludes. 
                                                 
5 Previous work has suggested that this is an important consideration. See Griffith and Harrison (2004).     8
2  Theoretical framework 
Product market competition provides a constraint on both the price-setting behaviour of firms 
and the wage-setting behaviour of unions. In a simple model firms set prices as a mark-up over 
wages, and the mark-up is determined by the elasticity of demand for their product. Increasing 
competition reduces the mark-up firms can apply, leading to increased output and hence 
employment. Unions bargain with firms to set a wage, in the knowledge that firms will take a 
mark-up over this wage. As such, unions know that high wages will be passed to consumers as 
higher prices and will result in lower output, more so when the elasticity of demand is higher. 
Therefore, when unions care about employment as well as wages, increasing competition will 
lead them to further limit their wage bargaining. Hence, increasing competition in the product 
market will increase employment, and by more so when union bargaining power is high.  
In this section we briefly illustrate this effect in a standard closed economy model of 
monopolistic competition in goods, in the presence of firm level union bargaining. The model is 
based closely on Chapter 15 of Carlin and Soskice (2005), and consists of elements from the 
classic models of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Very similar 
results arise in the model of Jackman, Layard and Nickell (1991) and in more recent work by 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Spector (2004) amongst others. We also discuss the effect of 
competition on the real wage, and briefly consider the impact of coordinated bargaining at an 
industry or economy-wide level. 
2.1  Monopoly firms, monopoly unions 
Consider a closed economy with N sectors, each consisting of one firm and one consumer-
worker, and each represented by one union. Firms use labour to produce a single good, and the 
goods are imperfect substitutes. Worker-consumers have constant elasticity of substitution 
preferences and an increasing aversion to work.
6 Firms monopolise their sectors and unions 
monopolise firms, as they control all of the labour in their sector.  
                                                 
6 The increasing marginal disutility of work is necessary for a unique equilibrium in the presence of constant returns 
to scale production. It captures the idea that workers have a higher reservation wage in times of high employment, 
due for example to increased personal wealth, household income or more opportunities for employment.       9
The output of firm i is  i i e y = , where y denotes output and e denotes employment. Demand for a 
firm’s product is determined by its relative price, which is given by  N A p y i i /
η − = , where p is 
the nominal price, η  is the elasticity of demand, A indicates the level of aggregate demand in the 
economy and N is the number of sectors. Firms choose the relative price to maximise profits for 
a given wage, constrained by the elasticity of demand in their product market. That is, they solve 
the following: 
i i i i i
p
e w y p
i
− = Π max  ,    subject to  N A p y i i /
η − = , 
where Π are profits and w is the cost of a unit of labour. The resulting first order condition gives 
us the price-setting schedule:  






As competition increases, the relative price tends to the cost of labour, i.e. as  i i w p → ∞ → , η . 
Each monopoly union can set the real wage that maximises its utility, subject to the firm’s price-
setting behaviour, and constrained by the elasticity of demand in the product market. The union’s 
utility is that of the representative worker, consisting of the workers income minus the disutility 
















, and  N A p e y i i i /
η − = = , 
where U is the union’s utility function, σ  is the employment elasticity of the disutility of 
employment (and is greater than one if the marginal disutility of employment is increasing), and 










i i e w . 
                                                 
7 In this model the representative worker’s effort is bounded between zero and one, and can be thought of as an 
employment rate. An increasing marginal disutility of effort means that σ>1.     10
As competition increases, the real wage tends to the marginal disutility of effort, i.e. as 
1 ,
− → ∞ →
σ φ η i i e w .  
Taking logs of (1) and (2) and aggregating by averaging over all sectors,
 8 we obtain: 
(3)    
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By symmetry, the prices in all sectors are the same and therefore log p=0. An equilibrium is an 
employment level where the real wage is acceptable to both wage setters and price setters, i.e. 
PS WS w w log log = .
9  
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We can compare this, first, to a situation with imperfect product market competition but no 
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8 Using logx≡N
-1 Σlogx 
9 This is the non-accelerating inflation employment rate. An inflation-targeting central bank will adjust the interest 
rate to maintain this equilibrium.      11
As we would expect 
poly DoubleMono ly FirmMonopo Competive log log log e e e e e e > > . One market 
imperfection leads to lower employment than none, and two to lower than with one. From 
expressions (5) and (6) it is also clear that an increase in product market competition that reduces 
the mark-up will increase employment, and will increase it more in the presence of a monopoly 
union. This is the key intuition that we attempt to investigate empirically. 
In our empirical approach we use country level measures of collective bargaining coverage and 
trade union membership to capture variation in the nature of wage and employment setting.
10 
One way to interpret this is that countries with a higher proportion of workers covered by 
collective bargaining agreements or belonging to unions correspond more closely to the double-
monopoly case, while countries with lower levels of bargaining coverage or union membership 
correspond more closely to the single firm-monopoly case. For example, we could think of 
countries with higher levels of bargaining coverage or union membership as having a higher 
proportion of sectors characterized by the double-monopoly case. 
An alternative interpretation is that collective bargaining coverage or union membership are 
summary measures of workers’ bargaining power in a setting where there is bargaining between 
firms and unions. Union power may be constrained by a number of factors such as regulations on 
the right to strike, the extent of control over the workforce or the presence of other unions. At 
one extreme of workers’ bargaining power lies the monopoly union and at the other extreme is 
the single firm monopoly, with a range of bargaining power in between. The intuition described 
above then has an equivalent as follows: an increase in product market competition that 




                                                 
10 We also consider the role of bargaining coordination – see below for a discussion of this. 
11 This result also comes directly out of recent theoretical models of product and labour market regulation. For 
example, in the case where firms have the right to manage it is implicit in equation (14) of Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003) and equation (6) of Spector (2004). The equivalent results for the case of efficient bargaining are equation (6) 
in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and equation (7) in Spector (2004). In a dynamic framework, Ebell and Haefke 
(2004) find that the positive effect of competition on employment is greater when workers bargain collectively than 
when they bargain individually, even when the choice of bargaining institution is endogenous.     12
2.2  Wages  
In the model described above, the effect of increased competition on real wages is independent 
of union bargaining power. The real wage is entirely determined by product market conditions 











log log e w  
The result that the real wage is independent of union bargaining power is a direct consequence of 
the assumption that firms can set prices and employment conditional on the bargained wage. In 
this right to manage framework firms set prices as a mark-up over the bargained wage and the 
impact on the general price level offsets any increase in the bargained wage. If, on the other 
hand, we assume efficient bargaining, where firms and unions bargain over employment and the 
real wage simultaneously, then the real wage becomes a positive function of union bargaining 
power – workers are able to capture a proportion of the available rents that is increasing in their 
bargaining power. In this case an increase in competition that reduces the available rents will 
increase the real wage by a smaller amount when workers have higher levels of bargaining 
power. Competition hurts individuals as workers but, through its effect on the price level, 
benefits them as consumers.  
As discussed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), while efficient bargaining may not be a 
complete description of the actual bargaining processes, it does capture the possibility that, when 
there are rents, stronger workers may be able to obtain a higher wage without suffering a 
decrease in employment, at least in the short run. To the extent that this is the case, we would 
expect to see that the positive impact of competition on wages is smaller when workers have 
more bargaining power. 
Another consideration with regard to wages concerns the role of fixed capital. In the presence of 
fixed capital in the production function, workers and firms will bargain over the resulting quasi-
rents. Spector (2004) shows that in this case the overall impact of product market competition on 
wages may be negative, as the reduction in workers’ rents and quasi-rents more than offsets the 
reduction in the price level.     13
2.3  A note on coordination  
Finally, an important characteristic of union bargaining is the degree to which unions coordinate 
their activities. Calmfors and Driffill (1988) argue that there should be a U-shaped relationship 
between employment and the degree of coordination. The reason for this is that unions have an 
incentive to coordinate in sectors that are close substitutes in order to decrease the elasticity of 
demand for their (combined) product. However, as the combined union becomes larger the effect 
of its wage demands on aggregate prices increases. Its members suffer from this and worker-
consumers therefore moderate their demands, and employment increases. In this way an 
intermediate level of coordination, at the industry level for example, results in the lowest 
employment, since union bargaining power is high, but worker-consumers have little incentive to 
take into account the impact of their wage demands on the aggregate price level. 
To the extent that true economy-wide coordination does lead to more moderate wage demands, 
we should expect to see that the interaction between product market competition and measures of 
union density or bargaining coverage is less strong in coordinated countries. However, to the 
extent that the main effect of coordination is to increase workers’ bargaining power we should 
expect to find that the impact of competition on employment is larger (and the impact on wages 
smaller) in more coordinated economies.
12 We test for these effects in the robustness section. 
2.4  Testable predictions 
From this discussion we take the following empirical predictions to the data:  
1.  Increased product market competition reduces unemployment. 
2.  The reduction in unemployment is larger when workers’ bargaining power is higher. 
3.  Increased product market competition increases the real wage. 
4.  The increase in the real wage may be smaller when workers’ bargaining power is higher, 
to the extent that bargaining deviates from the right to manage framework. 
                                                 
12 For example, Flanagan (1999) argues that centralised bargaining in many OECD countries is “more form than 
substance” (p. 1167)     14
3  Empirical implementation and data 
The discussion above suggests that competition will affect the unemployment rate and real 
wages, and will do so differently in economies with different labour market institutions. We are 
therefore interested in empirically exploring the following relationships: 
(9)  
U
it t i it it i it it it t f X LMR BP UR ε α α µ α µ α + + + + + + = 4
'
3 2 1 * 
(10)  
W
it t i it it i it it it t f X LMR BP w ε β β µ β µ β + + + + + + = 4
'
3 2 1 * 
where i indexes countries and t years, UR is the unemployment rate, µ is a measure of the 
average level of profits firms earn, BPi1 captures labour market regulations that indicate the 
bargaining power of workers in the economy (at the start of the sample period – see below), 
LMRit is a vector of other labour market regulations and institutions, and  it X  contains a set of 
cyclical and other controls, including a measure of the deviation of output from trend growth, the 
real exchange rate and the change in the inflation rate.  it X also contains the public sector 
employment rate to control for any potential impact of public sector employment in crowding out 
private sector employment. Of course public and private sector employment are likely to be 
jointly determined, so we check that our results are robust to dropping this variable from the set 
of controls. We do the same for the other controls, and also check that the results are robust to 
using employment rather than unemployment as the dependent variable. Country fixed effects 
are captured by country dummies, fi, and common macro shocks by year dummies, tt.   
We capture the extent of product market competition by the average level of firm profitability in 
the economy, µ. Therefore, a key issue in estimating (9) and (10) is the potential for 
measurement error and endogeneity of µ. For example, a positive demand shock might increase 
both output and firm profitability. We pay careful attention to instrumenting µ using policy 
reforms to product markets. We show that the reforms we use affect average profitability in the 
economy in a sensible way and we confirm the power of our instruments. Our approach assumes 
that such reforms affect labour market outcomes only through their impact on competition and 
not directly, and we test the statistical validity of these exclusion restrictions. In order to identify 
the key parameters of interest separately from other cross country differences we need to have     15
indicators of product market regulations and reforms that vary differentially over time across 
countries or industries.  
In examining how the effect of competition depends on labour market institutions we focus on 
labour market characteristics that affect workers’ bargaining power. We capture this using 
indicators of collective bargaining coverage and trade union membership, which in themselves 
may be endogenous: for example, an adverse shock on employment or wages may trigger an 
increase in union membership. Therefore, we use initial values of coverage and union density to 
capture variation in workers’ bargaining power across countries. The implicit assumption is that 
bargaining power does not change significantly over time, and the data suggests that this is not 
an unreasonable assumption, particularly for bargaining coverage.  
3.1  Data  
In order to investigate these issues empirically we need data on (i) unemployment and wages, (ii) 
the extent of product market competition and indicators of exogenous product market reforms, 
(iii) labour market regulations, and (iv) other country characteristics. We discuss each of these in 
turn. The composition of the sample, sources and descriptive statistics are given in a data 
appendix. 
3.1.1  Unemployment and wages 
We use the OECD’s standardised unemployment rate, which is the number of unemployed 
persons as a percentage of the civilian labour force. This is important because, in general, 
decreases in the unemployment rate are associated with increases in participation (e.g. see 
Blanchard (2005)). Our story is one of bargaining power and the medium run equilibrium in the 
labour market, so we are keen to isolate these from participation effects. However, we also check 
that our results are robust using employment rather than unemployment as a dependent variable. 
We use two alternative measures of real wages. First we use a real wage index for 
manufacturing. Unfortunately, comparable wage data is not available for all countries in our 
sample at the total economy level. We therefore also use total economy labour costs, which 
includes payroll taxes, and control for the tax wedge and find similar results to manufacturing.      16
Precise definitions, means and standard deviation of these variables are shown in Table A.2 in 
the data appendix. 
3.1.2  Product market competition and reforms 
We capture changes in the extent of competition using a measure of the average level of firm 
profitability.
13 In a simple model of bargaining such as that set out in Section 2 this corresponds 
closely to the equilibrium mark-up over costs. We calculate the average level of profits as value 
added over costs: 
it it
it
it ts CapitalCos s LabourCost
ValueAdded
+
= µ  
where all variables are in nominal prices.
14 We assume that all economies are open and use the 
US long term interest rate to proxy the time variation in the cost of capital.
15 In our calculation of 
average profits, we exclude the public sector and agriculture and, where possible, we exclude the 
real estate sector which suffers from inflated values due to rising property prices.
16 The average 
level of profitability in our sample is 1.31 and increases slightly over the period 1985 to 2000. 
This measure is pro-cyclical and varies both within and between countries (see Table A.2 in the 
Data Appendix).
17 We therefore include a measure of deviation from trend output growth and the 
change in the rate of inflation to control for country specific business cycles, as well as the real 
exchange rate to control for trade shocks. In addition, country dummies control for any 
differences in measurement that are constant over time. 
                                                 
13 We can think of this as an estimate of the mark-up or price cost margin (similar to a Lerner Index) if average costs 
are close to marginal costs. This is shown by Boone (2001) to be theoretically preferable to most other commonly 
used measures of competition, especially those based on market concentration or the number of firms, and it most 
closely corresponds to the parameter specified in theoretical models. 
14This can be shown to be equivalent to that proposed by Roeger (1995).  See also Klette (1999) for a discussion. 
15 We repeat the analysis using time-varying country specific interest rates (see the robustness section for some 
discussion). 
16 In Portugal we can not make these exclusions due to lack of data so we use the total economy. We can remove the 
real estate sector in Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway and the USA. 
17 Overall, our measures are similar to other examples in the literature, for example those calculated for 
manufacturing industries by Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996).     17
At first the fact that average profitability trends upwards over time may seem to conflict with 
most preconceptions about changes to the degree of competition associated with product market 
reforms, globalisation and opening to trade. One explanation, discussed in Blanchard and 
Giavazzi (2003) and Boulhol (2004), is that upwards trending measured firm profits could be a 
short term response to reductions in the bargaining power of workers. The intuition is that 
declining bargaining power reduces the share of rents captured by workers in higher wages, and 
increases the share that are measured in firms’ profits.
18 In the long term, the increase in 
profitability associated with declining workers’ bargaining power would be expected to lead to 
entry and a reduction of rents to their previous level, but to the extent that these effects occur 
with lags it is possible for the rent transfer effect to dominate the entry effect during the 
transition period. We control for these types of changes by including time-varying measures of 
labour market institutions in all specifications. In addition, any trends that are common across 
countries will be captured by year effects.  
Finally, one drawback of our measure is that it contains the implicit assumption of constant 
returns to scale. This measure of profitability is biased downwards (upwards) in the presence of 
increasing (decreasing) returns to scale. However, since industrial structure does not change very 
quickly over time, any bias that might arise due to different levels of increasing returns to scale 
across countries should be captured by the fixed country effects in our econometric analysis. 
Similarly, any trends that are common across countries will be captured by year effects. 
Key to our identification strategy is using time-varying indicators of product market reforms for 
each country. We use information on four types of reform - the implementation of the EU Single 
Market Programme (SMP), changes in tariff and non-tariff barriers and the burden of 
government bureaucracy. 
The SMP was concerned with eradicating cross-country differences in product and service 
standards, administrative and regulatory barriers, VAT and capital controls which inhibited the 
free flow of goods, services and factors of production between EU countries. Of the 14 countries 
in our sample, seven were involved in the programme (Belgium, Denmark, France, the United 
                                                 
18 This is in a context of efficient bargaining. The intuition remains valid to the extent that bargaining deviates from 
the right-to-manage framework.     18
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands and Portugal) and seven were not (Australia, Austria, Canada, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, the USA). We also exploit the fact that, among participants, the SMP 
both had a differential effect across countries and was implemented at different rates.  
To capture variation in the impact we use a survey carried out before the programme was 
implemented. Cecchini et al (1986) surveyed 11,000 firms in different industries asking 
respondents to rate the current level of various barriers to trade. Based on this survey Buiges et al 
(1990) identified 40 out of 120 industrial sectors that were deemed to be most sensitive to the 
programme. They consulted individual country experts to confirm their findings. We use the 
percentage of industry (specifically the percentage of employment) that was sensitive to the 
programme for each country. We also use the fact that different countries passed the reforms into 
law at different rates. The European Commission recorded this from 1997 onwards in its Internal 
Market Scoreboard and we modify our variable accordingly using differences across countries in 
the average rate of implementation.
19 We combine these sources of variation to construct a 
variable that indicates the percentage of industry liberalized over time.  
We also use three other indicators to supplement the variation provided by the Single Market 
Programme. The first is based on an indicator of the administrative burden on business from the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, and is available for the 1990s. The 
indicator is provided by the Fraser Institute and is based on responses to the following question 
asked to 10,000 business leaders in the Executive Opinion Survey: “How much time does your 
firm's senior management spend dealing/negotiating with government officials?”. A large 
amount of time spent with government bureaucracy may constitute a barrier to entry, hinder 
firms’ expansion, or may indicate a significant amount of government involvement in business 
decision-making, all of which can inhibit competition.  
The second is an index of average tariff rates. This is constructed by the Fraser Institute using 
data from a number of sources, including the World Bank, the OECD, UNCTAD and GATT. 
The third is a similar measure of the extent of non-tariff barriers to trade available for the 1990s. 
This is based on survey questions on hidden import barriers and the cost of importing equipment 
to measure changes in the trade environment that are not captured in the SMP variable.     19
A description of the sources for these variables and their means and standard deviations are 
provided in Table A.3 in the data appendix. 
In the results reported below we pay careful attention to showing that these reforms provide 
powerful instruments for the degree of profitability (in that they enter significantly in the first 
stage regression) and that they are valid instruments (in that they can be excluded from the 
second stage). 
3.1.3  Labour market regulations 
The labour market variables that we use fall into two categories: those that directly reflect 
worker bargaining power, which we use in the interaction with competition, and those that have 
been shown in the literature to affect unemployment, which we use as controls. The proportion 
of workers who are paid wages determined by firm/union bargaining whether or not they belong 
to a union (referred to as bargaining coverage), and the proportion of workers who are actual 
members of a union (referred to as union density) fall into the first category. We find bargaining 
coverage a more convincing and accurate measure of bargaining power, and use it in the first 
instance, changing to union density for robustness.
20 An index of employment protection 
legislation, the benefit replacement ratio, the tax wedge between the production wage and the 
consumption wage, and a measure of the degree of coordination of bargaining in the economy 
fall into the second category.
21 
A description of the sources for these variables and their means and standard deviations are 
provided in Table A.3 in the data appendix. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
19 The scoreboard is available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/score/index_en.htm  
20 The classic example is that of France, which has the lowest union density in our sample (12.5%), but a very high 
level of bargaining coverage (90%). 
21 See Nickell at al (2005) for a discussion of these variables and their impact on unemployment outcomes.     20
4  Results   
We now turn to an empirical investigation of the predictions set out in Section 2. We start by 
considering the first stage, or reduced form, regression of average profitability on the indicators 
of product market reforms, before moving on to the main results examining the effects of 
changes in competition on employment and wages. 
4.1  The effect of product market reforms on average profitability 
The first stage regression of average profitability on indicators of product market reforms and all 
other controls takes the following form: 
(11)  
µ ε γ γ γ µ it t i it it it it t f X LMR PMR + + + + + = 3
'
2 1  
where  it PMR  represents a vector of time and country varying indicators of product market 
regulation,  it LMR  represents a vector of time and country varying indicators of labour market 
regulation (which are also included in the employment and wage regressions later on), and X 
includes the output gap, changes in inflation, the real exchange rate, and the share of 
employment accounted for by the public sector, as discussed in Section 3. 
All the product market variables are increasing with liberalisation, so a negative coefficient 
suggests that reforms which liberalise product markets are associated with lower average 
profitability. Column (1) in Table 1 shows the first stage using the SMP variable alone. We can 
see that it is highly statistically significant and negative, meaning that entering the SMP had a 
negative impact on average profitability, which we interpret as a positive impact on competition.  
The magnitude of the SMP effect is such that, if the SMP affected 50% of industry, as it did in 
the case of the UK for example, then we estimate that economy-wide average profitability 
decreases by 3 percentage points as a result.
22 In Column (2) we add in several other product 
market reforms, and the four variables together are significant at the 1% level. This is the first 
stage regression used to identify the linear competition effect in column (3) of Table 2.  
                                                 
22 For example, using the estimate from column 1 in Table 1, we have 0.00066*50=0.03, which indicates a drop in 
profitability from e.g. 0.13 to 0.10, or from 13% to 10%...     21
We estimate equations (9) and (10) both for the linear case (restricting α2 and β2 to be zero) and 
including the interaction terms with bargaining power (α2 and β2 non-zero). Therefore we need 
reduced forms for both the linear variable and the interaction. In column (3) we interact the 
product market reforms with bargaining coverage. In the long run, when the number of firms in 
the economy is endogenous, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show that the equilibrium level of 
rents in the economy depends on both entry costs and workers’ bargaining power, which justifies 
including these interactions in the first stage.
23 We show at the bottom of column (5) of Table 2 
that the excluded instruments have strong explanatory power, in the sense that they are jointly 
significant at the 1% level and have a partial R-squared of about 9%. In column (4) we show the 
reduced form for the interaction term, which has similar properties. 
Table 1: The Impact of Product Market Reforms on Competition 
Dependent variable:  Profitability ( it µ ) Profitability  ( it µ ) * 
Bargaining Coverage in 
1986 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Single Market Programme  -0.00066 -0.00048  -0.00060  -0.01364 
  [0.00026] [0.00031]  [0.00032]  [0.02778] 
Average Tariff Rate   -0.02813  -0.02064 -10.50267 
   [0.01601]  [0.05146]  [4.10911] 
Government Bureaucracy   -0.00387  -0.09118  -5.23088 
   [0.00822]  [0.06655]  [5.29911] 
Non-Tariff Barriers   0.02075  0.01997  1.28659 
   [0.01435]  [0.01516]  [1.31458] 
   -0.00017  0.09813  Average Tariff Rate *  
Bargaining Coverage 1986     [0.00058]  [0.04713] 
   0.00103  0.05005  Government Bureaucracy * 
Bargaining Coverage 1986     [0.00079]  [0.06331] 
   0.00010  0.00935  Tax Wedge *  
Bargaining Coverage 1986     [0.00007]  [0.00651] 
Labour market controls: Tax wedge, 
employment protection, benefits, 
coordination 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Other controls: output gap, change in 
inflation, real exchange rate, public 
sector employment rate 
Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Notes: The regressions include 206 observations on 14 countries over the period 1986-2000. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. All specifications include country and year dummies. 
                                                 
23 See equation (8) on page 889 of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). We also tried including the SMP interacted with 
bargaining coverage but found that the data rejected this specification in the sense that the Hansen test in the second 
stage rejected the over-identifying restrictions.     22
4.2  Main Results 
We now turn to the estimation of the determinants of unemployment, as expressed in equation 
(9). In Table 2 we start in column (1) by looking at the relationship between labour market 
regulations and the unemployment rate. The results are consistent with those in Nickell et al 
(2005), and several other studies, in that taxes and the benefit replacement rate have a 
significantly positive effect on unemployment and coordination has a negative effect, whereas 
employment protection legislation has no significant effect on its own.
24 The output gap has a 
significant negative coefficient as expected, the change in the inflation rate is not significant, and 
the real exchange rate has a significant negative coefficient, indicating that a more appreciated 
exchange rate is associated with a lower equilibrium level of unemployment. The coefficient on 
the public sector employment rate is significantly higher than minus one, suggesting that 
unemployment decreases less than one-for-one with an increase in public sector employment. In 
the robustness section we show that the results are robust to dropping some of these controls. 
In column (2) we include the linear effect of average profitability on unemployment. The 
significant positive coefficient suggests that increasing competition (a decrease in profitability) 
decreases the unemployment rate. Controlling for the endogeneity of competition by using our 
IV estimator in column (3) indicates that the OLS estimates are negatively biased, as the 
coefficient becomes more positive when we instrument. This is as expected: for example 
unobserved shocks that increase profitability are likely to decrease unemployment. Instrumenting 
will also help to reduce any attenuation bias that may be present due to classical measurement 
error in profitability. At the bottom of column (3) we present diagnostics showing the strength 
and validity of the excluded instruments. The p-value and partial R2 of the excluded instruments 
suggest that they have power, and the Hansen test suggests that we can not reject the over-
identifying restrictions that the policy reform variables can be excluded from this regression. 
 
 
                                                 
24 Nickell et al (2005) find that interactions between different labour market institutions can be important in 
explaining unemployment. We do not investigate this possibility as our main focus is on the impact of product 
market competition.     23
Table 2: The Impact of Competition on the Unemployment Rate 
Dependent variable: 
Unemployment Rate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  OLS  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Competition Variables         
Profitability   6.857  17.102 -17.858 -0.272 -13.361 1.700 
   [2.402] [8.612] [5.705]  [12.975]  [3.855] [7.538] 
    0.300 0.375     Profitability * Bargaining 
Coverage in 1986      [0.062] [0.134]    
      0.297 0.157  Profitability * Union Density 
in 1986        [0.049] [0.078] 
Labour Market Controls         
Tax Wedge  0.109 0.118 0.131 0.079 0.099 0.039 0.083 
  [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.060] [0.044] [0.046] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation  -0.271 -0.225 -0.157 -0.035 0.172  0.193  0.033 
  [0.289] [0.279] [0.268] [0.266] [0.328] [0.270] [0.281] 
Benefits Replacement Ratio  10.72 9.591 7.905 6.943 2.360 8.810 8.268 
  [2.984] [3.055] [3.149] [2.948] [3.844] [2.455] [2.525] 
Coordination Index  -1.328 -1.446 -1.622 -1.172 -1.513 -0.885 -1.245 
  [0.364] [0.367] [0.384] [0.391] [0.485] [0.327] [0.363] 
Other Controls         
Output Gap  -0.515 -0.563 -0.635 -0.566 -0.733 -0.545 -0.592 
  [0.044] [0.047] [0.075] [0.046] [0.074] [0.046] [0.058] 
Change in Inflation  -1.454 0.246 2.786 -0.231 5.549 -1.259 0.822 
  [5.830] [5.740] [6.325] [5.555] [8.278] [4.999] [5.007] 
Real Exchange Rate  -0.070 -0.057 -0.037 -0.062 -0.018 -0.063 -0.049 
  [0.012] [0.013] [0.022] [0.012] [0.023] [0.012] [0.016] 
Public Sector Employment Rate  -0.546 -o.537 -0.523 -0.396 -0.329 -0.491 -0.505 
  [0.122] [-.109] [0.093] [0.107] [0.119] [0.102] [0.091] 
Constant  4.783  -4.778 -19.061 35.951 -29.396 35.451  -8.651 
  [2.829]  [4.248] [12.780] [8.513] [12.346] [7.079]  [8.436] 
         
1
st Stage P-value:     linear 
                                 interaction  







st Stage Partial R2: linear 
                                 interaction 






P-value for Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions 
   0.20  0.27  0.08 
Notes: The regressions include 206 observations on 14 countries over the period 1986-2000. Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. All specifications include country and year dummies. 
In columns (4) and (5) we look at how the impact of increased competition varies with collective 
bargaining coverage, measured at the beginning of the sample period to mitigate potential 
problems of endogeneity. In columns (6) and (7) we consider the equivalent interaction with 
union density. The results provide evidence of interaction effects with both bargaining coverage 
and union density, and in both cases they are as theory predicts: an increase in competition     24
decreases the unemployment rate more so in the presence of strong worker bargaining power. In 
the case of bargaining coverage the interaction effect becomes slightly larger once we 
instrument, whereas with union density the interaction becomes smaller, but the linear effect 
larger. We have no strong a priori reason to believe that the direction of the bias in the 
interaction term should be positive or negative. However, the mean effect in both cases 
increases, which is consistent with the hypothesis that any bias in profitability dampens the 
estimated effect of competition. At the bottom of columns (5) and (7) the p-values for the test of 
significance of the excluded instruments and the partial R2 suggest that the instruments have 
power. In column (5) we cannot reject the validity of the overidentifying exclusion restrictions, 
while in column (7) we can not reject at the 5% level, but can at the 10% level.  
What are the economic magnitudes of these effects? The magnitude of the results in column (3) 
suggest that a 3 percentage point drop in profitability predicted for the UK’s entry into the SMP 
would, all else equal, result in a decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.51 of a percentage point 
(17*-0.03). To assess the magnitude of the interaction in column (5) we can compare the effect 
of a 3 percentage point drop in profitability on economies that have a bargaining coverage one 
standard deviation either side of the mean (which is 75%). An economy with an initial coverage 
of 53%, somewhere between that of Canada (39%) and the UK (64%), will experience a 
decrease in the unemployment rate of 0.59 percentage points (-0.03*(-0.27+0.38*53)), whereas 
an economy with an initial coverage of 97%, similar to that of Austria (99%), will experience a 
decrease of 1.08 percentage points (-0.03*(-0.27+0.38*97)), a difference of half a percentage 
point. The coefficient when we use union density is smaller and the comparable difference in the 
unemployment effect between a low density economy and a high density economy is 0.21 
percentage points, again corresponding to one standard deviation either side of the cross-country 
mean. The smaller interaction effect with union density is consistent with our view that, perhaps, 
it does not measure bargaining power as well as coverage. 
Table 3 presents the results for the wage regression as written in equation (10). Ideally we would 
like to use economy-wide average real wages as the dependent variable, however, for many of 
the countries in our sample real wages are only available for the manufacturing sector. Therefore, 
we start by showing results for real wages in manufacturing (in the left hand panel of the table) 
and then look at real total labour costs (in the right hand panel) which we have for the whole 
economy. We use the appropriate measure of profitability in each case.     25
In column (1) when we include profitability in manufacturing in an OLS regression on real 
wages we find no impact. In column (2) we use an instrumental variables estimator to control for 
the potential endogeneity of profitability. At the bottom of the table we show that the instruments 
are both powerful and valid for profitability in the manufacturing sector. The significant negative 
coefficient on profitability suggests that competition has a positive effect on wages. The 
difference between the OLS and IV estimates suggests that the OLS coefficient is biased 
upwards, as would be expected if there was a positive correlation between profitability and 
wages due to unobserved shocks or other factors. As before, instrumenting will also help to 
reduce any attenuation bias that may be present due to classical measurement error in 
profitability. 
Consider as before the impact of joining the SMP on a country such as the UK where 50% of 
industry was expected to be affected. The coefficient (standard error) on the SMP variable in the 
first stage for manufacturing is -0.0019 (0.0003), suggesting that the impact of the SMP was to 
reduce average profitability in UK manufacturing by about 9 percentage points (0.0019*50). The 
coefficient on profitability in column (2) of Table 3 implies that the predicted impact of the SMP 
in UK manufacturing was an increase in the real wage of about 5.4%. 
In column (3) we include the interaction with bargaining coverage in an OLS regression, and in 
column (4) we use our IV estimator. Recall from Section 2 that, to the extent that bargaining 
deviates from right-to-manage, we expect the positive impact of competition on real wages to be 
smaller in countries where workers have high levels of bargaining power. The results in column 
(4) are consistent with this prediction, although the interaction is only significant at 10%. Using 
the same 9 percentage point reduction in average profitability as in the example above, the size 
of the effect is such that a low bargaining coverage country (53% as before) will experience an 
increase of about 4.5% in real wages (-0.09*(-79+0.55*53)), whereas a high coverage country 
(97% as before) will experience an increase of only 2.3% (-0.09*(-79+0.55*97)). Theory 
suggests that workers should be better off in all countries and our results are consistent with this: 
even with a coverage of 100% the interaction effect does not outweigh the linear effect.  
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Table 3: The Impact of Competition on the Real Wage 
Log of Real Wage Index  Log of Real Labour Costs Per Hour  Dependent variable: 
Manufacturing Manuf.  Total  Economy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS  OLS  OLS IV 
Competition Variables          
Profitability (manuf)  -1.056  -60.291 -69.685 -79.082 -76.626       
  [9.471]  [21.670] [19.551] [23.550] [16.942]       
    0.899 0.546 0.870        Profitability  (manuf.)* 
Bargaining Coverage in 
1986      [0.220] [0.306] [0.192]       
Profitability (priv. sec.)        -145.706  -124.116  -176.422 
        [25.641]  [28.126]  [61.486] 
      1.406  1.245  1.803  Profitability (priv. sec.)* 
Bargaining Coverage in 
1986        [0.272]  [0.313]  [0.569] 
Labour Market Controls          
Tax Wedge  -0.165 -0.177 -0.271 -0.237 0.826  0.551  0.368  0.272 
  [0.258] [0.259] [0.230] [0.229] [0.150] [0.158] [0.161] [0.167] 
Employment Protection 
Legislation  0.435 1.39 1.931 1.93 -1.303  0.171  -0.945  -0.436 
  [1.521] [1.448] [1.505] [1.435] [1.116] [1.108] [1.040] [1.055] 
Benefit Replacement Ratio  -1.295  -6.354 -17.892  -14.474 -0.200 11.453 14.893 10.175 
  [14.029] [15.084] [11.571] [13.986]  [9.994]  [8.790]  [8.350]  [9.550] 
Coordination Index  2.488 -0.288 3.937 1.663 -0.221 -0.431 -2.035 -1.561 
  [2.124] [2.395] [2.022] [2.294] [2.301] [2.069] [1.899] [1.824] 
Other Controls          
Output Gap  0.241 0.666  0.27  0.52  0.233 0.290 0.261 0.307 
  [0.208] [0.255] [0.198] [0.214] [0.169] [0.170] [0.148] [0.314] 
Change in Inflation  4.73  -19.143 3.027 -10.964 -1.903  9.715  9.295  7.714 
  [30.814] [28.468] [33.253] [27.658] [40.123] [31.629] [31.640] [32.918] 
Real Exchange Rate  0.021  -0.22  0.004 -0.138 0.002 0.102  0.16  0.141 
  [0.074] [0.106] [0.068] [0.085] [0.054] [0.046] [0.052] [0.087] 
Constant  4.694 5.730 5.336 5.470 3.799 4.302 4.164 2.174 
  [0.189]  [37.144] [24.770] [29.622] [20.563] [30.179] [33.395] [56.449] 
Observations  176 176 176 176 176 176 206 206 
1
st Stage P-value: linear         
interaction    0.0000 
-    0.0000 
0.0000      0.0329 
0.0013 
1
st Stage Partial R2: linear 
interaction     0.2229 
-    0.3380 
0.2257      0.2499 
0.4045 




0.14  0.14      0.08 
Notes: The regressions include 176 observations on 13 countries over the period 1985-2000. Compared to the other 
Tables we lose Portugal, most of Norway and a few observations from Austria, Belgium and France. Robust 
standard errors appear in parentheses. Country and year dummies are included throughout. The set of excluded 
instruments are the same as for the unemployment regressions, except that non-tariff barriers is not used as its 
exclusion fails the Hansen test.  
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To investigate this further, and in particular to see whether there is an interaction effect at the 
level of the total economy, we also use data on real labour costs per hour worked as a proxy for 
wages in the right hand panel of Table 3. In column (5) we run the equivalent OLS specification 
to column (3) on the same sample and see that the coefficients on the competition measures are 
broadly similar, suggesting that labour costs is a good proxy for wages (conditional on the other 
controls). The coefficients on the tax wedge and other labour market controls are quite different. 
This is because they are, in part, controlling for differences between labour costs and wages. In 
particular the coefficient on the tax wedge is now positive and significant, as would be expected 
given that payroll taxes are included in labour costs.  
In column (6) we run the same regression but now using data for the whole economy for the 
same combination of country-year observations. The basic results are very similar to the 
manufacturing results, although the size of both coefficients on the competition measures is 
about twice as large. However, as we shall see below, after accounting for the different means of 
the variables and different effects of the product market reform variables on average profitability 
between the two samples, the overall predicted effects of product market reforms on real wages 
is similar. 
In column (7) we run the same regression as in column (6) but now for the larger sample for 
which we have data on labour costs rather than wages (see data appendix for details). This makes 
little difference. In column (8) we use our IV estimator to control for possible endogeneity of 
profitability. As with wages in manufacturing we see that the direction of the OLS bias on the 
overall effect is positive. Consider the same 3 percentage point reduction in average profitability 
as a result of the SMP as in the total economy example for unemployment. The size of the effect 
in column (8) is such that a low bargaining coverage country (53% as before) will experience an 
increase of about 2.4% in real wages (-0.03*(-176+1.80*53)), whereas a high coverage country 
(97% as before) will experience an increase of only 0.1% (-0.03*(-176+1.80*97)). 
4.3  Economic significance 
Table 4 further quantifies the economic significance of our estimates by comparing the actual 
changes in unemployment and wages for each country between 1988 and 1998 (the years 
between which we have a balanced panel of countries) to the predicted changes from product 
market reforms based on our estimates. In each case we first examine the predicted impact of the     28
SMP for participant countries, and then the predicted impact of changes in all the product market 
reform variables. In all cases we have controlled for common year effects and country-specific 
business cycles and macroeconomic shocks, so changes are relative to the cross-country average. 
For unemployment we have also controlled for the share of employment in the public sector. The 
predicted changes use estimates from column (4) of Tables 2 and 3 respectively.  
Beginning with the impact on unemployment, the table shows that the predicted effects of 
product market reforms in reducing unemployment are substantial. For some of the countries the 
SMP variable accounts for a large part of the impact, but the other product market variables also 
explain a significant amount of variation. For example, our estimates suggest that the SMP was 
associated with a 1.1 percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate in Portugal, while all 
the product market reforms that we measure were together associated with a 2.6 percentage point 
reduction. This compares with an actual reduction in the unemployment rate relative to the cross-
country average trend of 1.1 percentage points. Thus factors other than product market reforms 
appear to have been responsible for an increase in the unemployment rate relative to the cross-
country average trend of 1.5 percentage points. Overall the predicted changes due to all the 
product market reforms are positively correlated with the actual changes across countries, with a 
correlation coefficient of 0.35. 
The predicted effects for real manufacturing wages are also substantial. The impact of the SMP 
makes up a larger amount of the total variation than in the case of total economy unemployment, 
which is perhaps unsurprising given that the main impact of the SMP was in manufacturing 
industries. Overall, the predicted changes due to all the product market reforms are again 
positively correlated with the actual changes across countries, but the correlation coefficient is 
lower than before at 0.20. Thus, while the predicted impact of product market reforms on both 
unemployment and wages is highly significant in economic terms, in both cases there remains a 
significant amount of variation over time that is not explained by reforms to product markets. 
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Table 4: Predicted effects of product market reforms, 1988 to 1998 
 Total  Economy Manufacturing 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Country  ∆Unemployment  Explained by 
SMP 







Explained by all 
product market 
reforms 
Australia 0.2  0.0  -0.2  -2.6  0.0  2.8 
Austria 2.9  0.0  -0.2  -1.2  0.0  1.1 
Belgium -1.6  -1.0  -0.4  -1.4  4.0  2.5 
Canada  -3.5  0.0 0.2 -1.1 0.0 -3.5 
Denmark  -0.4 -0.8  -2.2 5.8 5.0 7.2 
Finland  4.8  0.0 1.6 14.0 0.0 -0.5 
France 1.3  -1.0  -1.3  0.9
*  4.0 4.2 
United  Kingdom  -5.9 -0.7  -1.3 8.7 5.8 7.1 
Italy 0.2  -1.0  -1.1  -6.5  4.5  5.1 
The  Netherlands  -1.2  -0.8  -2.9 14.0 4.2  7.4 
Norway  2.7  0.0  -1.4  - - - 
Portugal  -1.1  -1.1  -2.6  - - - 
Sweden 2.5  0.0  -0.3  -7.7  0.0  0.4 
USA  -1.0  0.0 -0.2 -12.2 0.0  5.2 
Notes: All columns are calculated using de-trended values, controlling for the business cycle, the real exchange rate  
and changes in the inflation rate, and, in the case of unemployment, the public sector employment rate.  
* This is the 1988 to 1997 difference, due to lack of wage data for France in 1998. 
 
4.4  Robustness 
We now turn to a number of potential robustness concerns. First, we investigate whether our 
results are robust to controlling for the level of bargaining coordination. We then consider two 
forms of measurement error - we use an alternative measure of the cost of capital that does not 
assume open capital markets, and we use employment, rather than unemployment, as the 
dependent variable. We also test that our results are robust to the set of control variables 
included. These are discussed in turn. 
The first concern is whether our main results are robust to controlling for the level of bargaining 
coordination. As discussed in Section 2, to the extent that true economy-wide coordination does 
lead to more moderate wage demands, we should expect to see that the interaction between 
product market competition and measures of union density or bargaining coverage is less strong 
in coordinated countries. However, to the extent that the main effect of coordination is to     30
increase workers’ bargaining power we should expect to find that the impact of competition on 
employment is larger (and the impact on wages smaller) in more coordinated economies.
25 
To investigate this we split the countries in our sample into three groups according to the average 
value of their coordination index. The highly coordinated countries are Austria, Denmark, 
Finland, The Netherlands and Norway; the intermediates are Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal 
and Sweden; and the low coordination countries are Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA.
26 In 
the first column of Table 5 we extend the specification in column (4) of Table 2 to include 
interactions between dummies for the high and intermediate coordination groups and the average 
level of profitability, as well as interactions between these and the level of bargaining coverage. 
If the interaction effect between increased competition and bargaining coverage is indeed less 
strong in highly coordinated countries we would expect to see a significant negative coefficient 
on the three-way interaction between average profitability, bargaining coverage, and the dummy 
for the highly coordinated group. While the estimated coefficient is indeed negative it is 
insignificant, and the same is true for all of the additional interactions. 
In the second column we test the simpler alternative hypothesis - that the main effect of 
coordination is in fact to increase worker bargaining power. In other words, any incentives that 
coordinated worker-consumers have to moderate their wage demands are more than offset by an 
increase in their bargaining power due to the lower elasticity of demand for their (combined) 
product. To test this we drop both of the three-way interactions and include only the interactions 
between the dummies for the highly coordinated and intermediate groups and the average level 
of profitability. As well as a significant positive coefficient on our usual interaction between 
average profitability and bargaining coverage, we also find significant positive coefficients on 
both of these additional interactions. This provides some evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that the main effect of coordination is in fact to increase worker bargaining power. Thus the 
largest effect of increased competition on employment is in countries where bargaining coverage 
is high and coordination is also intermediate or high.  
                                                 
25 For example, Flanagan (1999) argues that centralised bargaining in many OECD countries is “more form than 
substance” (p. 1167) 
26 The results are robust to changing the categorisation so that only Finland, The Netherlands and Norway are 
considered as highly coordinated.        31
Table 5: Coordinated Bargaining 
Dependent variable: 
Unemployment Rate  Log of Real Labour Costs Per 














Profitability -22.012 -20.089 -125.531  -121.213 
 [6.489]  [5.595]  [33.393]  [27.465] 
0.230 0.201 0.989 0.923  Profitability * Bargaining Coverage in 1986 
[0.083] [0.079] [0.547] [0.430] 
36.675 12.735 -9.509  0.809  Profitability * Intermediate Coordination Dummy 
[37.627] [4.465]  [421.416]  [23.411] 
17.706 10.918 53.641 35.417  Profitability * High Coordination Dummy 
[17.954] [4.169] [58.575]  [20.570] 
-0.289 - 0.104 -  Profitability * Intermediate Coordination Dummy  
* Bargaining Coverage in 1986  [0.442]  [4.883]  
-0.088 - -0.233 -  Profitability * High Coordination Dummy                
* Bargaining Coverage in 1986  [0.204]  [0.782]  
Labour market controls: Tax wedge, employment 
protection, benefits, coordination 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cyclical controls: output gap, change in inflation, 
real exchange rate, public sector employment rate 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  206 206 206 206 
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. All specifications  include country and year dummies.  
The highly coordinated countries are Austria, Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands and Norway; the intermediates 
are Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal and Sweden; and the low coordination countries are Australia, Canada, the UK 
and the USA. The results are robust to changing the categorisation so that only Finland, The Netherlands and 
Norway are considered as highly coordinated. 
 
 
In columns (3) and (4) we repeat the same test for the log of real labour costs per hour in the total 
economy and the results are very similar.
27 As before our previous results are robust and the 
three-way interactions between profitability, the coordination dummies and bargaining coverage 
are insignificant in column (3). In column (4) the interaction between profitability and the high 
coordination dummy is positive and significant, but only at the 10% level. These results suggest 
that our main result for labour costs is fairly robust across different measured levels of 
coordination, and that as above the main effect of coordination is if anything to increase workers’ 
bargaining power. 
                                                 
27 We do not use the manufacturing real wage index because the country coverage is less good (we lose Portugal and 
most of Norway), as described in the discussion of the main results. However, the results using the manufacturing 
real wage index are similar.     32
 
A second concern is whether our results are sensitive to our measure of the cost of capital. In our 
main results we use the US long term interest rate to proxy variation over time in the cost of 
capital for all countries. This assumes that capital markets are fully open throughout the sample 
period. If capital markets were liberalized by some countries during the sample period in a way 
that was correlated with reforms to product markets this could potentially affect our results. To 
check the robustness of our results we re-ran all results assuming that capital markets are fully 
closed, and hence domestic interest rates are a better proxy for changes in the cost of capital. Our 
main results are robust to this change.
28 
We also check that our main results are robust to the set of control variables included. For 
example, if we drop the change in the inflation rate, the real exchange rate and the public sector 
employment rate from the specification in column (5) of Table 2 the main results are not 
significantly affected. For example, the coefficients (standard errors) on profitability and the 
interaction between profitability and bargaining coverage are 5.826 (10.980) and 0.345 (0.137) 
respectively. 
Another potential measurement concern is with our use of the unemployment rate as the 
dependent variable. To investigate this we instead use the log of employment as the dependent 
variable, and include the size of the labour force as a control, as well as the log of public sector 
employment. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 show the OLS and IV estimates from this 
regression. The key difference between this and the unemployment regressions is that we no 
longer restrict the coefficient on the labour force to equal one. The key coefficients on 
profitability, and the interaction between profitability and bargaining coverage, are robust to this 
change of specification. In column (3) we drop the log of public sector employment and the main 
results are again unchanged.  
                                                 
28 For example, for the instrumented unemployment regression (Table 2 column 3) the coefficient (standard error) on 
profitability, for the 185 observations for which the domestic interest rate is available, is 12.792 (4.777). In Table 2 
column (5) the coefficients (standard errors) on profitability and the profitability*bargaining coverage terms are       
-1.093 (9.100) and 0.168 (0.103) respectively. For the instrumented wage regression, using real labour costs per 
hour for the total economy (Table 3 column 8) the equivalent coefficients (standard errors) are -115.751 (28.206) 
and 1.556 (0.310).      33
Table 6: Employment rather than unemployment rate  
Dependent variable: Log of employment, 
Total Economy 
(1) (2) (3) 
 OLS  IV  IV 
Profitability 0.14073  -0.04246 -0.03619 
  [0.05965] [0.15008] [0.15509] 
-0.00237 -0.00366 -0.00415  Profitability * Bargaining Coverage in 1986 
[0.00067] [0.00147] [0.00150] 
Log of labour force  0.91962  0.87468  1.0195 
  [0.04578] [0.06329] [0.05064] 
0.185 0.16075  - 
[0.03579] [0.04276]   
Log of public sector employment 
   
Labour market controls: Tax wedge, 
employment protection, benefits, coordination 
Yes Yes Yes 
Cyclical controls: output gap, change in 
inflation, real exchange rate 
Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  206 206 206 
P-value for Hansen test of  
overidentifying restrictions 
- 0.31  0.23 
Robust standard errors appear in parentheses. Country and year dummies are included throughout. 
The magnitude of the estimated effects in Table 6 are very similar to those using the 
unemployment rate. For example, consider again the impact of joining the SMP, which is 
associated with on average a 3 percentage point reduction in profitability, for a country with high 
bargaining coverage (97% as before). Using the estimates from column (2) of Table 6, this is 
associated with a 0.95% increase in employment (0.03*(-0.042+(-0.0037*97)), which is 
comparable with a predicted reduction in the unemployment rate of 1.08 percentage points 
calculated from column (5) of Table 2. The equivalent changes for a low bargaining coverage 
country (53% as before) are a 0.46% increase in employment predicted by column (2) of Table 6 
(0.03*(-0.042+(-0.0037*53)) and a 0.59 percentage point reduction in the unemployment rate 
predicted by column (5) of Table 2. 
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5  Conclusion 
High rates of unemployment remain a key policy concern across many European countries. 
Attention has focused on labour market institutions as the main determinant of unemployment, 
but recent work suggests that they can not fully explain the variation across countries and over 
time. In this paper we have used time varying information on product market reforms to test 
theoretical predictions that higher levels of competition increase employment and real wages. 
We have also examined whether the increase is larger for employment and smaller for real wages 
when workers’ bargaining power is higher.  
Empirically we have shown that the significant product market de-regulation experienced in the 
1990s by some OECD countries was associated with an increase in competition as measured by 
average firm profitability. Such exogenous increases in competition are further associated with 
increases in aggregate employment and the real wage. We estimate that in countries with higher 
levels of collective bargaining coverage and/or union density the increase in employment is more 
pronounced, and the increase in real wages less so. Although some of the key reforms that we 
have used specifically targeted manufacturing, we find that even manufacturing workers with 
very high bargaining coverage were, in real wage terms, better off as a result of the product 
market reforms. 
Our results have interesting implications for policy. First, widespread product market reforms 
will benefit workers and the economy as a whole through increased employment and higher real 
wages. Second, the presence of strong unions is not a reason to shy away from product market 
reform – if anything there is more incentive to reform as the employment benefits may be larger. 
However, it is also under these circumstances that reform may be most resisted as existing 
workers have less to gain. 
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Data Appendix 
Our data consist of an unbalanced panel on 14 countries over the period 1986-2000. Table A.1 
shows the structure of the panel. Spain and Greece are excluded from the analysis due to a lack 
of data availability, and Germany is excluded due to re-unification, which is likely to have 
swamped any effects from product market reform. The second panel of Table A.1 shows the 
mean and standard deviation of our measure of profitability. It is important to note that the 
inclusion of country dummies in all specifications controls for average differences across 
countries in the level of measured profitability due to differences in measurement or other 
differences that are constant over time. Thus the main results are identified from differential 
within-country changes over time. 
Table A.1: Sample composition and average profitability by country 
Country  Total economy  Manufacturing  Standard Deviation 
 unemployment,  labour 
costs 
wages 
Mean of average 
profitability   
Australia 1986-2000  1986-2000 1.2944  0.0596 
Austria 1986-2000  1986-1999  1.2716 0.0505 
Belgium 1986-2000  1986-1998 1.2995  0.0349 
Canada 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.3972  0.0534 
Denmark 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.4980  0.0456 
Finland 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.2120  0.1011 
France 1986-2000  1986-1997  1.2828 0.0259 
UK 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.3679  0.0527 
Italy 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.4889  0.0832 
The Netherlands  1986-2000  1986-1999  1.2419  0.0560 
Norway 1986-1999  1997-1999  1.2297  0.1283 
Portugal 1988-1999  -  1.2222  0.0275 
Sweden 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.2029  0.0664 
USA 1986-2000  1986-2000  1.3698  0.0376 
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